Book review: "Why The Democrats Are Blue"
Blue, so blue, my love is burning blue.
Any brighter flame would be a lie.
"How Much I Lied," Gram Parsons, 1973.
Using the word "blue" for the Democrats works on so many levels. Brother Marathon Pundit gave me Mark Sricherz' Why the Democrats are Blue: Secular Liberalism and the Decline of the People's Party for my birthday last month, which I finished reading last week during my vacation.
This is not a "Why The Democrats Suck" book. Sticherz is a Democrat and a practicing Catholic. And a large part of why the Democrats have lost seven out of the last ten presidential elections is that the Dems have spurned the Catholic vote. The affinity for Roman Catholics to the Democratic Party goes back to the 1830s, but the post-1968 Democratic Party elite has little use for them. Not even having a Catholic (some dispute that, calling John Kerry a "CINO," a Catholic-in-name-only) at the top of the Democrats' ticket helped them four years ago, the Republicans won the Catholic vote, as they have every presidential election since 1976. And Jimmy Carter won that year.
Hmm...I think we are on to something.
The situation reminds me of the famous Ronald Reagan quip, "I didn't leave the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party left me." Reagan wasn't Catholic (his father was, and he was a Democrat), and Reagan became a Republican in 1962. It's not a perfect analogy, but Reagan's comment resonated with my parents (both Catholic) and millions of people like them.
From the ashes of the 1968 Democratic National Convention fiasco came the McGovern Commission. Whereas most people remember the quadrennial get-together for Boss Daley's cops beating up hippies, the McGovern Commission had the greater influence on the party.
From Why The Democrats Are Blue:
Officially known as the the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, the commission was approved by a majority of delegates at the convention that (Bill)Clinton deplored, the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The twenty-eight member panel is best known for creating the modern presidential nominating system, in which primary and caucus voters rather than big-city and state bosses choose the party's nominee. It is also known for its first chairman, Senator George McGovern, who won the party's nomination in 1972.
What an amazing coincidence that McGovern got the nod!
More...
The most significant consequence of the McGovern Commission is that the Democratic Party's coalition changed and shrank. The New Deal or Roosevelt coalition had included white southerners, Catholics, union members, blacks, and intellectuals. Under this coalition, the national party was a majority party, and its presidential candidates won seven of the ten elections from 1932 to 1968.
Seven of ten elections? Where have I heard that before?
And some more...
The McGovern Commission destroyed this old alliance and replaced it with the social change coalition led by secular liberals. The commission pushed through a rules change that required informal delegate quotas for women and young people. The proposal had three major consequences. First, while the Democratic coalition added feminists and secular professionals, it drove away blue-collar workers and Catholics, many of whom became Reagan Democrats. Second, it broke the Democratic Party's longstanding alliance with the Catholic Church. Third, it reduced the number of Democratic constituents. According to the party strategists, William Galston and Elaine Kamarck, only 21 percent of the electorate regard themselves as liberal, while 34 percent regard themselves as conservative.
The Democrats are playing a sport popular in small high schools, nine man football. But the Republicans have eleven players suited up for each game.
The 1972 Democratic National Convention in Miami Beach was a disaster for the party. Besides nominating the hapless McGovern, who managed to win just one state and the District of Columbia in the general election, the conventions credentials committee kicked the elected delegate slate led by the one of the bosses, Mayor Richard J. Daley, replacing it with a "more representative" group of liberal activists, minorities, and women led by the Rev. Jesse Jackson and lakefront liberal William Singer.
The contrast of this confrontation couldn't be more stark. Stricherz doesn't go into detail about this incident, but I will. I recall a column by Mike Royko, which explained that if Jesse really felt that sincere about toppling the Daley slate that year, then he should have run his own slate in the Illinois Democratic Primary. Not only did he not do that, he didn't even bother to vote in the primary.
But quotas were viewed more as "fair" than having an elected slate of delegates at the convention, and the legendary mayor and his fellow delegates were sent home. Daley, known for his Irish temper and stubbornness among other things, was understandably livid about getting "86ed" in Miami Beach.
That fall, McGovern attempted a rapprochement with Daley, but it was too late. Not only did Richard Nixon win Illinois by an enormous margin, he accomplished the seemingly impossible--he got more votes than McGovern in Cook County, something no Republican presidential candidate has accomplished since.
In fact, to lose Cook, the Democrats have to try to lose, which is exactly what they did in 1972.
Besides making the contemporary Democratic Party more hospitable to Catholics and other voters of faith, Stricherz has a number of suggestions to repair the problems the world's oldest political party faces, but going back to the Boss System is not one of them. You have to read--and buy--to find out what they are, but dumping quotas and caucus elections are just two of them.
Whether you are a Democrat of Republican, this book is a must-read for any political junkie.
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